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I. INTRODUCTION
Gender-based crimes were rampant during the decade-long armed
conflict in Sierra Leone. Crimes of sexual violence such as rape, sexual
mutilation, and sexual slavery were committed.1 There were also crimes
targeted against individuals based on gender, including the forced
recruitment of boys and men into fighting forces or diamond mining, and
the forced marriage of girls and women to combatants.2 The Special Court
*

Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario (Canada).

1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE’LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY”: SEXUAL

VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT 25-50 (2003), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sierleon0103.pdf (reporting acts of sexual
violence by all actors in the conflict, including rape, rape with objects such as weapons
or burning wood, “virgination” of young girls, sexual mutilation, forced pregnancies,
forced abortion, and sexual slavery); PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WAR-RELATED
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN SIERRA LEONE: A POPULATION-BASED ASSESSMENT 2-4 (2000)
(deducing from study data that approximately 50,000 to 64,000 internally displaced
women in Sierra Leone may have been victims of sexual violence, including rape (89%
of study participants), gang rape (33% of study participants), sexual slavery (15% of
study participants), and several other crimes that occurred mostly between 1997 and
1999).
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 42-43 (noting that rebel forces
used abduction as a means of recruiting by forcibly conscripting boys and men in
towns the rebel forces attacked, and that abducted women became sexual slaves and
were forced to perform slave labor); SUSAN MCKAY & DYAN MAZURANA, WHERE ARE
THE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES IN NORTHERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND
MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES DURING AND AFTER WAR 91-93 (2004) (observing that
girls participated in fighting forces as cooks, porters, caretakers, laborers in diamond
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humanity and war crimes committed during the conflict.3 Given the
widespread nature of gender-based violations, it was likely that the Special
Court’s trials would explore the accountability of individuals for these
crimes.4 Thus, the Prosecutor of the Special Court made the prosecution of
gender-based crimes a priority. As a result, ten out of the thirteen accused
from the Sierra Leone conflict were charged with the crimes against
humanity of rape and sexual slavery, and the war crime of outrages upon
personal dignity.5 Six of the accused were also charged with forced
marriage under the heading of the crime against humanity of other
mines, and as “wives” of combatants).
3. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 138, at 138.
4. However, it was not a foregone conclusion—other international criminal
tribunals have had spotty records with respect to the prosecution of gender-based
crimes, even when the conflicts under their mandate were rife with such crimes. See,
e.g., BINAIFER NOWROJEE, “YOUR JUSTICE IS TOO SLOW”: WILL THE ICTR FAIL
RWANDA’S RAPE VICTIMS? 6, 9 (criticizing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda’s (ICTR) sexual violence prosecution record, noting that because the
Prosecutor’s Office lacked a comprehensive strategy for prosecuting sexual crimes, no
rape charges were brought in 90% of the cases, and 20% of the cases resulted in
acquittals because the Prosecutor’s Office failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable
doubt).
5. The ten charged with these crimes included Charles Taylor, three Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) accused, three Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) accused, Sam Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koroma, and Foday Sankoh. The
indictments against Bockarie and Sankoh were later withdrawn due to their deaths. See
Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-03-04-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 33, 41-45
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Sam Bockarie with rape, sexual slavery and any other form of
sexual violence, and outrages upon personal dignity) withdrawn, Case No. SCSL 0304-I-022, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003) (withdrawing Bockarie’s indictment
due to his death). The original indictment noted that
the AFRC/RUF routinely captured and abducted members of the civilian
population. Captured women and girls were raped; many of them were
abducted and used as sex slaves and as forced labour. Some of these women
and girls were held captive for years. Men and boys who were abducted were
also used as forced labour [and held captive] . . . . AFRC/RUF also physically
mutilated men, women and children, including amputating their hands or feet
and carving ‘AFRC’ and ‘RUF’ on their bodies.
Id. ¶ 33. See Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-03-03-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 39-43
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Koroma with the same sexual violence crimes as charged
against Bockarie); Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-03-02-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 42-46
(Mar. 7, 2003) (charging Sankoh with the same sexual violence crimes as charged
against Bockarie); see also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT,
Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment, Counts 4-6 and ¶¶ 14-17 (May 29, 2007)
(detailing charges of rape, sexual slavery, and outrages upon personal dignity against
Charles Taylor, including the rape of an unknown number of women and girls in Kono
District, Kailahun District, and Freetown and the Western Area, as well as the
abduction and forced sexual slavery of girls and women from these areas). The
Prosecutor tried to amend the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) indictment to include
similar charges, but was unsuccessful. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the
Indictment, ¶ 6 (May 20, 2004) (describing the Prosecution’s proposed amendment to
the original indictment adding counts of rape, sexual slavery, other inhumane acts like
forced marriages, and outrages upon personal dignity). The Norman decision is
examined in more detail in Parts IV and V, infra.
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inhumane acts.6
In 2007 and 2008, the Special Court issued its first two trial-level and
first two appellate-level judgments in what are popularly known as the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and Civil Defence Forces
(CDF) cases.7 A number of important lessons on the prosecution of
gender-based violations can be drawn from these judgments and this
Article explores each of the lessons in turn. The first lesson from the
Special Court’s judgments to date is that seemingly gender-neutral crimes
may in fact contain gendered elements. Gendered crimes may be
multilayered and complex, and may include both sexual and non-sexual
aspects. This lesson emerges most noticeably from the AFRC trial and
appeals judgments. In Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, the Court
explored the nature of the crime against humanity of forced marriage as an
inhumane act.8 A majority of the Trial Chamber equated forced marriage
with sexual slavery, thereby categorizing forced marriage solely as a crime
of sexual violence.9 On appeal, the Appeals Chamber corrected this
misperception, characterizing forced marriage as a crime distinct from
sexual slavery because it is a “forced conjugal association with another
person resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury.”10
The second lesson relates to evidence. At the trial level in the CDF case,
the Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecutor’s initial request to amend the
joint indictment to include certain gender-based crimes, and a subsequent
request to consider evidence of gender-based acts as proof of either the
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts or the war crime of cruel
treatment.11 The dissenting justice and the Appeals Chamber both raised
important evidentiary issues to challenge the Trial Chamber’s decisions,

6. The AFRC accused and the three RUF accused were charged with forced
marriage. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Corrected Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 54-60 (Aug. 2, 2006) (charging the
RUF members with rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence, and
other inhumane acts, specifically forced marriages where the “‘wives’ were forced to
perform a number of conjugal duties under coercion by their ‘husbands’”); Prosecutor
v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated
Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57 (Feb. 18, 2005) (charging the three members of the AFRC with
rape, sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence, and other inhumane acts,
specifically forced marriages with members of the AFRC).
7. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment
(May 28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A,
Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL04-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara &
Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment (June 20, 2007).
8. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 701-704.
9. See id. ¶ 704 (finding that the Prosecution failed to establish the elements of
“forced marriage” as a crime independent of the crime of sexual slavery).
10. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195.
11. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 82-87 (dismissing the motion to amend the
Indictment as untimely, although noting that “[t]he Chamber is preeminently conscious
of the importance that gender crimes occupy in international criminal justice given the
very high casualty rates of females in sexual and other brutal gender-related abuses
during internal and international conflicts”).
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crimes, and that evidence of gender-based violations is not inherently more
prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.12
The final lesson relates to how the Court’s mandate to address genderbased crimes is connected with the rights of the accused. This lesson is
most evident in the CDF case, in which a majority of the trial judges failed
to bear in mind the Prosecutor and Court’s obligations to consider genderbased crimes with the defendants’ rights to be tried without undue delay
and to have adequate time to prepare a case. On appeal, Justice Winter
convincingly concluded in her dissent that the majority trial judges should
have considered several other important factors: the scope and nature of the
amendments, the consequences of admittance or denial of amendments on
the trial proceedings, the fairness of the proceedings to both the defense
and prosecution, whether denial of the amendments would impede the
Special Court’s fulfillment of its mandate, and whether victims would be
provided with proper access to justice.13 In other words, the majority trial
judges should have balanced the rights of the accused with these other
relevant matters.
It may seem that some of these lessons are obvious. For example, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR) have considered evidence of gender-based acts under the
heading of crimes such as torture, inhumane acts and enslavement.14 These
tribunals have also recognized the difficulties of collecting evidence of
gender-based violations.15 Even though the ICTY and ICTR explored these
issues prior to the Special Court’s consideration in the AFRC and CDF
cases, it is important to note that the Special Court has confirmed that these
approaches are correct. The Special Court’s reasoning creates internal
precedent for the remaining Special Court cases and, more generally,
strengthens accepted practice within international criminal law. The
Special Court has also analyzed gender issues not yet examined by the

12. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeal Judgment, sec. VII, ¶¶ 80-85
(Winter, J., partially dissenting opinion) (finding that the trial court erred by dismissing
the prosecution’s motion to amend the indictment because it is extremely difficult to
obtain evidence of gender-based sexual crimes and that allowing the prosecution to
temporally and geographically expand their investigation would not have compromised
the defendants’ rights).
13. See id. ¶¶ 82-86 (finding error with the Trial Chamber’s reluctance to admit
evidence of sexual violence because the allegations were not specifically pleaded in the
Indictment, noting that the accused had sufficient notice that evidence of gender-based
sexually violent crimes such that it could be admitted under counts 3 and 4 of the
Indictment, and that the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief clearly noted evidence of rape
and sexual slavery).
14. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment,
¶ 745 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
¶ 267 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
¶ 697 (Sept. 2, 1998).
15. E.g., Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 417, 455 (discussing the
effect of sexual violence trauma on memory).
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ICTY or ICTR.16 The Special Court’s judgments to date demonstrate that
there is more work to do within international criminal law on the analysis
of gender-based violations, even though there has been much progress in
this field over the last fifteen years.
II. THE AFRC AND CDF ACCUSED
The conflict in Sierra Leone is widely recognized to have begun in
March 1991 with an attack in the Kailahun District by the rebel
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces led by a former soldier of the
Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh.17 RUF forces controlled large parts of
Sierra Leone, especially in the northern regions, by 1995.18 This success
prompted the emergence of local militias, primarily consisting of
traditional hunters, who fought on behalf of the government and became
known as the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).19 The CDF collaborated with
the fighting forces of the Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG.20 Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, leader of the
Sierra Leone People’s Party, won the March 1996 Sierra Leone presidential
elections.21 In May 1997, junior members of the Sierra Leone Army seized
power from the Kabbah government because they believed the government
favored the CDF over the Army.22 They formed a new government called
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Johnny Paul
Koroma23 who invited the RUF to join the AFRC.24 The AFRC and RUF
fought together to gain control over parts of Sierra Leone controlled by the
CDF as well as to control diamond mining.25 Over time, however, relations
between the AFRC and RUF deteriorated and the Kabbah government was
16. For example, the Special Court has studied forced marriage and concluded that
it is different from sexual slavery. See, e.g., Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT,
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 8, 10, 52
(May 6, 2004). In Brima, the Prosecution requested to amend the Indictment with
specific references to forced marriage. It submitted to the court an “Investigator’s
Statement” that explained “that the crimes of sexual violence are not simply sexual
slavery but are most appropriately characterized as ‘forced marriages.’ [The
Investigator] state[d] that new investigations have ‘clarified’ the nature of the
relationships.” Id. Ultimately, the court allowed the additional count of forced
marriage, viewing it as a “kindred offense” and concluded that the defense was already
on notice. Id.
17. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 4.
18. See id. (describing how RUF consolidated its territorial control to seize
nationwide power).
19. See id.
20. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 8-9.
21. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 5 (discussing
how government support for the CDF spurred a failed coup d’état by Johnny Paul
Koroma, who was imprisoned following the attempt).
22. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 164.
23. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 7 (finding that
this coup placed Koroma in power after freeing him from prison and suspending Sierra
Leone’s constitution).
24. See id.
25. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 166-172.
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and brutal atrocities.27 The AFRC eventually divided into two groups in
April 1999: the first group included the “West Side Boys,” who attacked
the civilian population in the Port Loko District; and the second group
included supporters of an RUF faction.
In July 1999, Kabbah’s
government signed the Lomé Peace Accord with the RUF, but hostilities
did not officially end until January 2002.28
Indictments against AFRC leaders Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy
Kamara, and Santigie Borbor Kanu were approved on March 7, May 28,
and September 16, 2003 respectively.29 The indictments were later
consolidated and amended.30 The amended consolidated indictment
charged Brima, Kamara, and Kanu with seven counts of crimes against
humanity, including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage (as a
separate inhumane act); six counts of violations of article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions; and one count of a serious violation of international
humanitarian law, namely the conscription, enlistment, or use of child
soldiers.31 Brima was arrested on March 10, Kamara on May 29, and Kanu
on September 17, 2003.32 Their joint trial began on March 7, 2005 and
concluded on December 8, 2006.33 The trial judgment was issued on June
20, 2007,34 and was followed by an appeals judgment on
February 22, 2008.35 Details relating to gender issues raised in these
judgments are examined in Section III of this Article.
Three individuals within the CDF were indicted by the Prosecutor of the
Special Court: Sam Hinga Norman was the CDF’s “National Coordinator,”
26. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 10.
27. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 173-207 (claiming that

attacks on Freetown continued after the AFRC signed the Conakry Accord in October
1997).
28. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 12.
29. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2003-06-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Brima, SCSL-2003-06-I, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order
for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2003-10-I,
Indictment (May 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kamara, SCSL-2003-10-I, Decision
Approving the Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest, and Order for Non-Disclosure
(May 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-13-I, Indictment (Sept. 15,
2003); Prosecutor v. Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2003-13-I, Decision Approving the
Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention, and Order for
Non-Public Disclosure (Sept. 16, 2003). An indictment was also issued for Johnny
Paul Koroma, Prosecutor v. Koroma, Case No. SCSL-2003-03-I, Indictment (Mar. 7,
2003). However, Koroma is presumed dead. See, e.g., War Crime Court Probes Death
Reports, BBC NEWS, June 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2992462.stm
(last visited May 21, 2009).
30. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16 PT, Further Amended Consolidated
Indictment.
31. See id. ¶¶ 41-79.
32. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, at Annex A: Procedural
History, ¶¶ 1-3.
33. See id. ¶¶ 58, 62.
34. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment.
35. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment.
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Moinina Fofana was the “Director of War,” and Allieu Kondewa was the
“High Priest.”36 The original indictment against Norman was approved on
March 7 and indictments against Fofana and Kondewa were approved on
June 24, 2003.37 The three indictments were later consolidated into a single
indictment on February 5, 2004.38 Norman, Kondewa, and Fofana were
charged with two counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II, and one count of a serious violation of international
humanitarian law.39 Norman was arrested on March 10 and Kondewa and
Fofana were arrested on May 29, 2003.40 Their joint trial commenced on
June 3, 2004 and was completed on November 29, 2006. Norman died in
February 2007, prior to the release of the trial judgment,41 and proceedings
against him were thereafter terminated.42 The trial judgment against
Kondewa and Fofana was issued on August 2, 200743 and the appeals
judgment on May 28, 2008.44 The gender-related aspects of these
judgments are discussed below in Parts IV and V.
III. LESSON ONE: GENDERED CRIMES MAY BE COMPLEX AND SEEMINGLY
GENDER-NEUTRAL CRIMES MAY CONTAIN GENDERED ELEMENTS
In the AFRC case, all three accused were charged with the crimes
against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, and any other form of sexual
violence, and forced marriage under the category of “other inhumane acts”
as well as the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity.45 Forced
marriage refers to the practice during the Sierra Leonean conflict of
assigning abducted girls and women to combatants as “wives.” These
36. See Prosecuter v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 1.
37. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-03-11-I, Indictment (June 24, 2003);

Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-12-I, Indictment, (June 24, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-08-I, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003).
38. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I,
Indictment (Feb. 5, 2004)
39. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-14-I, Indictment, ¶¶ 1-8 (Feb. 5, 2004).
40. See Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment on
the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 1 (Oct. 9, 2007) (noting that
the accused persons were arrested for allegedly committing crimes against humanity
and other serious offenses as defined by the Special Court for Sierra Leone); see also
Press Release, David M. Crane, Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone (Mar. 10,
2003), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/WhatHappening/Press
ReleaseOTP.html (announcing the arrest of Norman for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and violations of international humanitarian law).
41. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment ¶ 4 (stating that Norman died
in the hospital after completion of the trial).
42. See id. ¶ 5 (noting that the judgment in relation to the two remaining defendants
was based on the evidence of record submitted by all original parties).
43. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment (Aug. 2, 2007).
44. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals
Judgment, (May 28, 2008).
45. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Further Amended Consolidated
Indictment, ¶¶ 51-57 (discussing the widespread sexual violence committed against
civilian women and girls, including rapes involving multiple rapists and abductions of
groups of civilian women for the purpose of sexual slavery).
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undertake domestic labor such as cleaning, cooking, and laundry.46 They
were also expected to protect the property of their “husband” and to move
his possessions as needed.47 As a result of the violence they suffered, some
of these “wives” contracted sexually transmitted diseases or HIV.48 Thus,
forced marriage is a type of gender-based crime with sexual and numerous
non-sexual aspects.
However, it was not understood in this way by a majority of the Trial
Chamber in the AFRC case. The majority held that “the Prosecution
evidence in the present case does not point to even one instance of a
woman or girl having had a bogus marriage forced upon her in
circumstances which did not amount to sexual slavery.”49 According to the
majority, one must subtract the sexual aspects of the forced marriage
evidence (as these go to proof of sexual slavery) and the remaining nonsexual aspects (presumably the forced domestic labor, physical abuse, and
forced child-bearing and child-rearing) do not reach the gravity required for
“other inhumane acts.”50 Thus, the majority found that the evidence of
forced marriage was subsumed by the crime against humanity of sexual
slavery, and dismissed the forced marriage charges as redundant.51 The
majority also dismissed the sexual slavery charges for duplicity, as the
original charge was for “sexual slavery and any other form of sexual
violence.”52 The majority then considered the evidence of sexual slavery
under the war crimes charge of outrages upon personal dignity.
The majority of the Trial Chamber viewed forced marriage as a sexual
crime. By focusing entirely on the sexual aspects of forced marriage, the
majority focused too much on the sexual aspects of the crime and focused
too little on the harm caused by the non-sexual aspects. As a result, it did
46. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 10 (June 20, 2007)
(Sebutinde, J., concurring) (noting that stereotyped perceptions of women are
exacerbated during wartime and put women at greater risk for abduction and violence).
47. Id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 31 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (stating that “bush wives”
were also expected to gratify the sexual wishes of their husbands without question).
48. See id. ¶ 30 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (noting also that miscarriages were very
common among “bush wives,” and medical attention was often limited or unavailable
for such women).
49. Id. ¶ 710 (majority opinion) (noting that not one of the victims of sexual
slavery had given evidence that their rebel captor’s declaration of marriage had caused
any particular physical or mental trauma).
50. See id. ¶¶ 697, 703-704, 710 (arguing that such “inhumane acts” must include
conduct that is not subsumed by other crimes in the Statute).
51. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 711, 714 (Sebutinde, J.,
concurring) (maintaining that the use of the term “wife” by rebel forces was used to
show ownership over the victims rather than to establish a marital relationship with the
victims).
52. See id. ¶¶ 93-95 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (arguing that the proper remedy was
not to strike out the entire charge, but to sever “any other form of sexual violence”
from that charge); see also Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment,
¶¶ 99-110 (noting that the Appeals Chamber ruled that the sexual slavery charges
should not have been dismissed).
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not take into account the ongoing harm caused by the social stigma of
having been a “wife.”53 In dissent, Justice Doherty disagreed with the
majority’s approach. She outlined a collection of harms that may be
suffered by those who were forcibly married: abduction, repeated rape and
ongoing sexual violence, resulting pregnancies, physical abuse,
miscarriages, death threats, being forced to live with and be loyal to an
individual the victim fears or despises, forced relocation with the
“husband” as the troops moved, mental trauma, lasting stigma associated
with being labeled a “wife,” and rejection by society, all of which may be
compounded by the youth of the victim.54 Unlike the majority however,
she did not focus on the sexual aspects of forced marriage. Instead, she
argued that the “crucial element of ‘forced marriage’ is the imposition, by
threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator’s words or other
conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over the
victim.”55 She noted, however, that abduction, rape, and other acts may
help to prove the lack of consent of the victim.56 She also pointed out that
this definition of forced marriage meets the requirement of causing serious
harm to the mental or physical health of the victim and therefore qualifies
as an inhumane act as a crime against humanity.57
The Appeals Chamber took a view similar to that of Justice Doherty. It
chided the Trial Chamber majority for characterizing forced marriage as a
sexual crime: “no tribunal could reasonably have found that forced
marriage was subsumed in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.”58
They involve different elements of crime, and “unlike sexual slavery,
forced marriage implies a relationship of exclusivity between the ‘husband’
and ‘wife,’ which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this

53. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 16 (Sebutinde, J.,
concurring). Justice Sebutinde demonstrated a somewhat more nuanced view than that
expressed in the majority judgment, noting that “wives” were “forced to render genderspecific forms of labour (conjugal duties) including cooking, cleaning, washing clothes
or carrying loads for [the husband], for no genuine reward.” Id. She seemed to argue
that these acts are proof of the element of sexual slavery requiring the exercise of
powers attaching to the right of ownership, while the rape fulfilled another element,
that of requiring the perpetrator to cause the victim to engage in sexual acts. Id. This is
a narrow approach to forced marriage that views the gender-specific labor as a mode of
proof of the sexual crimes and not as separate proof of harm.
54. See id. ¶¶ 37-50 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (detailing testimony from a variety of
witnesses who had suffered abduction and forced marriage in Sierra Leone).
Testimonies included accounts of sexual slavery, forced domestic labor (such as
laundering, cooking, etc.), forced marriage, rape, and the status difference between
“wives” of commanders and other abducted women. Id.
55. See id. ¶ 53 (noting that such imposition of a forced conjugal relationship can
result from the perpetrator’s words or conduct).
56. See id. ¶¶ 52, 70 (reiterating that the crime of “forced marriage” is “concerned
primarily with the mental and moral suffering of the victim.”).
57. See id. ¶ 57 (asserting that the evidence presented met the legal threshold to
constitute a “crime against humanity”).
58. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195 (arguing that
there are a number of distinguishing factors between forced marriage and sexual
slavery, despite the fact that these categories share a common aspect of non-consensual
sex).
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a situation in which the perpetrator through his words or conduct, or
those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, compels a person
by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal partner
resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological injury
60
to the victim.

This comparison of the reasoning of the Trial and Appeals Chambers’
rulings leads to the conclusion that judges (and prosecutors, defense
lawyers and, in the International Criminal Court, victims’ counsel) must
not jump to the conclusion that gender-based crimes are to be equated with
the narrower category of crimes of sexual violence. Gender-based crimes
include crimes such as rape and sexual slavery, but the classification is
much wider. Forced marriage is one example of a gender-based crime that
may have sexual aspects (for example, repeated rape), but also may have
many non-sexual aspects (for example, forced child-bearing and childrearing, cooking and laundering).61 In other words, gender must be
understood in all of its complexity.62 The understanding of gender must
not be collapsed into that of sex.63
59. See id. ¶ 195 (asserting that such distinctions imply that forced marriage is not
a predominantly sexual crime in nature).
60. Id. ¶ 196 (noting that the Court’s definition refers explicitly to the concept of
forced marriage within the specific context of the conflict in Sierra Leone).
61. See id. ¶ 52 (Doherty, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “forced marriage” does
not require proof of physical violence).
62. Gender has been defined by the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor
on Gender Issues as
the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and
female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys,
as well as the relations between women and those between men. These
attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are
learned through socialization processes. They are context/time-specific
and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued
in a women or a man in a given context. In most societies there are
differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities
assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as
well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader
socio-cultural context. Other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis
include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.
Office of The Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Dep’t of
Economic and Soc. Affairs, Concepts and Definitions, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/osagi/conceptsandefinitions.htm (last visited May 21, 2009). See Valerie
Oosterveld, The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage:
Providing Clarity or Confusion?, 45 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 131-72 (2009) [hereinafter
Oosterveld, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage]; Valerie Oosterveld, The Special
Court for Sierra Leone’s Consideration of Gender-Based Violence: Contributing to
Transitional Justice?, 10 HUM. RTS. REV. 73-98 (2009) [hereinafter Oosterveld,
Consideration of Gender-Based Violence].
63. See Karen Engle, Feminism and its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime
Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778, 815 (2005) (examining how
the Office of the Prosecutor and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia emphasized ethnicity over gender as the motivating force behind the sexual
violence, thereby placing men and women within the same standard, and raising the
possibility that a gender-neutral approach could shift the focus from violence and
“gender oppression” to sex); Katherine M. Franke, Gendered Subjects of Transitional
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This author hopes that the International Criminal Court (ICC) will heed
this lesson, as a comprehensive understanding of gender will assist
prosecutors to better explain the harms suffered by certain victims, and this,
in turn, will help judges to understand these harms in a wider context.
Forced marriage of the kind discussed in the AFRC case has taken place in
the conflict in northern Uganda by the Lord’s Resistance Army.64 The
ICC’s Prosecutor has also referred to forced marriage in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.65 However, in this case the Prosecutor
has chosen to charge only the sexual slavery aspect of forced marriage and
not the other aspects.66 In the confirmation of charges hearing, he
successfully used evidence of forced marriage to prove that there is
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that civilian
women were subjected to the crime against humanity of sexual slavery.67
The Pre-Trial Chamber seemed to adopt an approach similar to that of
Justice Sebutinde in the AFRC case, using evidence of non-sexual acts
such as abduction, imprisonment and forced cooking as proof of the
exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.68 Perhaps in future
Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 813, 822-23 (2006).
The reduction of gender to the sexual and the ignorance of how men can suffer
gendered violence is, to be most generous, a form of overcompensation for the
years of ignoring women’s place in humanitarian law . . . . [T]o see the
‘gender issue’ surface only in the case of sexual violence is to elide the
gendered dimensions of war, violence, and the investment in killing over
caring.
Id.
64. See MCKAY & MAZURANA, supra note 2, at 73 (presenting data that shows that
girls’ functions within the LRA were more complex than the original reports focusing
on forced marriage and sexual slavery stated, and emphasizing that “72 percent
reported receiving weapons and military training”); see also Prosecutor v. Kony, Case
No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as
Amended on 27 September 2005, Counts 5 & 13 (Sept. 27, 2005) (noting that the
International Criminal Court has issued warrants of arrest including reference to sexual
slavery for Joseph Kony as the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army); ABDUCTED AND
ABUSED: RENEWED CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA, 15 HUM. RTS. WATCH 12(A),
July 2003, at 28-31 (describing forced marriage to LRA combatants resulting in rape,
unwanted pregnancies, forced childbearing and childrearing, transmission of sexually
transmitted diseases and HIV, and difficulties adjusting to post-LRA life).
65. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Prosecution’s Submission of Public Version of Document Containing the Charges, ¶ 89
(Apr. 24, 2008) (maintaining that women who were captured and spared because they
hid their ethnicity, were raped, forcibly taken to military camps and given as “wives” to
their captors).
66. Id. at Count 7.
67. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 353-354 (Sept. 30, 2008) (examining the
evidence presented by civilian women from Bogoro who were captured, raped and bore
children by their captors).
68. See U.N. PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT OF THE
PREPARATORY COMM’N FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., PART II: FINALIZED DRAFT TEXT OF
THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, at 13 (Nov. 2, 2000).
The ICC’s Elements of Crime delineates the following elements for the crime of sexual
slavery:
1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or
bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar
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The next part of the first lesson relates to the fact that seemingly genderneutral crimes may include gendered elements. A majority of the ARFC
Trial Chamber and a majority of the CDF Trial Chamber both mistakenly
concluded that acts of sexual violence should only be used to prove the
crimes against humanity of “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence” under article 2(g)
of the Special Court’s Statute.70 As mentioned earlier, in the AFRC case
the Prosecutor argued that forced marriage could be considered under the
crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts,” but the Trial Chamber
majority disagreed.71
The Appeals Chamber corrected this
misapprehension, noting that the ICTY and ICTR have recognized a wide
range of sexual and other gender-based acts as inhumane acts, and that
there is no reason why the listing of sexual violence crimes in article 2(g)
should foreclose the possibility of charging as inhumane acts crimes which
may have a sexual or gender component.72
A similar conclusion emerged in the CDF appeals judgment. During the
CDF trial, the Prosecutor brought a motion to determine admissibility of
acts of sexual violence73 as evidence of the crime against humanity of other
deprivation of liberty.
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts
of a sexual nature.
3. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population.
4. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to
be part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population.
Id.
69. This could be done through the charge of inhumane acts as a crime against
humanity, as was done in the Special Court, or by coupling charges of the crimes
against humanity of enslavement and sexual slavery. Another option, where warranted,
is to charge forced marriage as the crime against humanity of gender-based
persecution.
70. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2(g), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 145.
71. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 703-707, 710 (arguing for a
restrictive interpretation that the residual nature of “other inhumane acts” indicates that
evidence of a sexual nature could only be considered under the sexual slavery charge,
and that remaining evidence of forced marriage was not of sufficient gravity to qualify
as an “inhumane act”).
72. See Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 184-186 (asserting
that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Article 2(i) of the Statute excludes sexual
crimes and indicating that the statute must be interpreted expansively to prevent the
“imagination of future torturers” from getting around the crimes encompassed by the
statute).
73. In pleadings and decisions, the Special Court’s Prosecutor and the trial judges
tended to use the word “sexual” as if it is synonymous with “gender,” even where the
word “gender” was more appropriate. This Article uses the term “gender” where
appropriate, except when quoting judicial decisions that use the term “sexual” even
though the term “gender” should have been used. See Prosecutor v. Fofana &
Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, n.1294 (May 28, 2008)
(Winter, J., dissenting). Justice Winter noted that the prosecution used the term “sexual
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inhumane acts (Count 3 of the Indictment) and the war crime of cruel
treatment (Count 4).74 A majority of the Trial Chamber ruled that evidence
of sexual violence was not admissible under either count.75 While the Trial
and, therefore, Appeal Chambers’ consideration of this issue focused in
large part on whether the Prosecutor could bring such evidence when it was
not indicated in the Indictment, the Appeals Chamber, citing ICTY and
ICTR jurisprudence, did note that sexual violence can indeed constitute an
inhumane act as alleged in Count 3 and cruel treatment as alleged in
Count 4.76 The lesson emerging from both cases, therefore, is that acts of
gender-based violence can serve as evidence of crimes against humanity
other than rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
and any other form of sexual violence, including seemingly gender-neutral
crimes.
IV. LESSON TWO: CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE MUST
BE GENDER-SENSITIVE
The second lesson learned from the Special Court’s judgments to date is
that consideration of evidence must be gender-sensitive. This lesson was
most apparent in the CDF judgments, unfortunately because of the failure
of a majority of the Trial Chamber to undertake gender-sensitive
consideration of the evidence. The first example explored under this lesson
stems from Justice Itoe’s classification of evidence of gender-based crimes
as prejudicial, and the second relates to the dismissal by the majority of the
Prosecutor’s request to consider circumstances surrounding the collection
of such evidence in the CDF case.
The Prosecutor wished to introduce evidence of gender-based violence at
trial in order to prove elements of the crime against humanity of inhumane
acts and the war crime of cruel treatment. Despite the existence of ICTY
and ICTR case law in support of this argument, a majority of the Trial
Chamber denied this request, with Justice Itoe stating that “gender
evidence” amounts to “prejudicial evidence” because it is “of a nature [as]
to cast a dark cloud of doubt on the image of innocence that the Accused
violence” in its Ground of Appeal, even though it was referring to forced marriage.
Thus, she stated, “[i]n view of this consideration, the term sexual violence will be
referred to as ‘gender-based violence.’” Id.
74. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Decision on Urgent Prosecution Motion Filed 15 February 2005 for a Ruling on the
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶¶ 1-3 (May 23, 2005).
75. See id. (denying the Prosecution’s motion to delimit the adduction of particular
relevant and admissible evidence); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case
No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling
on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 19 (May 24, 2005) (holding that allowing the
admission of the evidence in question would prove unfair to the defendants and
derogate their due process rights).
76. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 441-442 (opining
that the failure of Counts 3 and 4 to explicitly list the sexual acts that might amount to
“other inhumane acts” or “cruel treatment” does not mean that sexual violent acts could
not act as proof “other inhumane acts” or “cruel treatment”; the absence of an explicit
list was simply a defect of the indictment).
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has the potential of staining the mind of the Judge with an impression
that adversely affects his clean conscience towards all parties, and
particularly, the party who is the victim of that evidence [i.e. the
accused] which is tendered, to the extent that it leaves in the mind of the
Judge, an indelible scar of bias which could make him ill disposed to the
cause of the victim of said evidence [the accused] as a result of which
injustice could be occasioned to the party who after all, may be innocent
or have a just cause, and who, but for the admission of that contested
evidence, should ordinarily have had the benefit of the judicial balance
78
tilting in his favour.

Justice Itoe concluded that the admission of evidence of sexual violence
is “unfairly compromising of the interests and status of innocence of the
good standing of the victim of such evidence [i.e. the accused].”79 In other
words, Justice Itoe implies that evidence of gender-based crimes is more
likely to impugn the reputation of the defendants than other kinds of
evidence, and that this perceived harm to the accused should guide the
justices. Justice Boutet, in dissent, convincingly replied that “[e]vidence of
acts of sexual violence are no different than evidence of any other act of
violence for the purposes of constituting offences within Counts 3 and 4 of
the Indictment and are not inherently prejudicial or inadmissible character
evidence by virtue of their nature or characterization as ‘sexual.’”80
On appeal, Fofana used Justice Itoe’s statements to argue against the
Prosecutor’s position.81 In response, the Appeals Chamber followed the
same line of argument as Justice Boutet and correctly held that “the right to
a fair trial enshrined in Article 17 of the Statute cannot be violated by the
introduction of evidence relevant to any allegation in the trial proceedings,
regardless of the nature or severity of the evidence.”82 The Appeals
77. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Separate Concurring Opinion of Hon. Justice Benjamin Mutanga Itoe, Presiding Judge,
on the Chamber Majority Decision on Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the
Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 78 (May 24, 2005) (voicing the fear that evidence of
gender-based crimes threatens the presumption of the defendants’ innocence).
78. See id. ¶ 64 (discussing the definition of prejudicial evidence, and focusing on
the risk of prejudicing the judge toward the defendants).
79. See id. ¶ 65 (distinguishing prejudicial evidence from incriminating evidence
by considering the probative value versus the potential for prejudice).
80. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Pierre Boutet on Decision on Prosecution Motion for a
Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶¶ 26-33, 36 (May 24, 2005) (disagreeing
with the majority’s refusal to grant the Prosecution’s request to amend the Indictment).
Justice Boutet cited several documents to support his argument that the stigmatizing
nature of gender-based crimes makes it particularly difficult to obtain the requisite
evidence needed to sustain a conviction. Boutet argued that the Prosecutor did not
have enough evidence at the time of the original Indictment to charge the accused with
gender-based crimes. Id.
81. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 446 n.864 (noting
that Fofana relied on Justice Itoe’s denial of the Prosecution’s request to amend the
Indictment since the evidence would be too prejudicial).
82. See id. (concluding that the relevance of the evidence outweighed the potential
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Chamber, therefore, clearly indicated that evidence of gender-based
violence is not inherently more prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.
This is an important, and rather basic, lesson that should be applied by all
international and domestic tribunals prosecuting international crimes.
Linked to this observation is the fact that the collection of evidence of
gender-based violence may be conducted under different circumstances
than the collection of other kinds of evidence, and that this difference
should be taken into account when relevant. In February 2004, prior to the
start of trial, the Prosecutor sought leave to amend the CDF indictment to
include four new charges: rape as a crime against humanity, sexual slavery
and any other form of sexual violence as crimes against humanity, other
inhumane acts (forced marriage) as a crime against humanity, and outrages
upon personal dignity as a war crime.83 On May 20, 2004, a majority of the
Trial Chamber denied the request on the basis that granting the amendment
would prejudice the rights of the accused, violate their right to be tried
without undue delay, and constitute an abuse of process.84 The majority
rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that he could not have requested an
amendment earlier because he did not have solid evidence of gender-based
violence earlier. The majority held that the Prosecutor was aware of
indications of gender-based crimes in June 2003 and that it was therefore
not timely to wait until February 2004 to submit the amendment request.85
The majority judges characterized the amendment motion as a prosecutorial
request for an exception to the general rules on timeliness for “gender
offences and offenders.”86
In dissent, Justice Boutet properly pointed out that the Prosecutor can
only bring a charge forward when the evidence meets the test of
“reasonable certainty of conviction,” which was only the case as of late
November 2003, when the Prosecutor was assured of the full cooperation
of witnesses willing to testify to gender-based violations.87 The Prosecutor
for prejudice, and that the defendants received sufficient notice as to the evidence
introduced).
83. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 6 (May 20,
2004) (noting that on February 9, 2004, the Prosecution requested leave to add four
new counts to the Indictment that directly address gender-based crimes).
84. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 86 (denying the Prosecution’s motion to amend the
indictment, stating that to allow such an amendment would unduly prejudice the
defendants’ rights to a fair and expeditious trial, and fearing that such a result would
work to bring the administration of justice into disrepute).
85. See id. ¶¶ 44, 55 (discussing the timing of the Prosecution’s decision to file a
motion to amend the indictment and concluding that some of the evidence relied upon
in the motion had long been in the Prosecution’s possession).
86. See id. ¶¶ 83-84 (observing that the rules governing gender offenses are no
different from those of other offenses and that to sustain the motion would create an
unwanted exception in the rules governing gender offenses).
87. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Boutet Dissent, ¶¶ 24, 35 (maintaining that the Prosecutor must have sufficient,
credible evidence before bringing charges, and that the prosecution filed its motion to
amend the indictment without undue delay following the discovery of sufficient,
credible evidence of gender-based violations).
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Boutet pointed out that it may take longer to secure evidence of genderbased crimes (especially crimes of sexual violence) than other crimes.88
Gender-based crimes, including rape, may have created psychological
damage and the survivors often live in fear of being ostracized and isolated,
or being the subject of reprisals.89 In Sierra Leone, myths about raped
adolescent girls and women—that these girls and women may become
barren, sexually obsessed, and unable to remain faithful to their
husbands—may create barriers to evidence collection.90 On appeal, Justice
Winter helpfully reiterated these factors.91 Thus, the test for timeliness in
bringing additional charges must take into account general and countryspecific circumstances related to gender-based violence.
The specific circumstances of evidence collection in any given case of
gender-based violence must also be taken into account. In the CDF case,
the Prosecutor had an additional hurdle to overcome: the CDF were viewed
by many as heroes, creating an additional level of reluctance in and risk to
potential witnesses.92 Therefore, it took more time to identify and ensure
protection for victims willing to testify. The Prosecutor pointed out that
“[i]n some circumstances, it was the existence of the Indictment and
subsequent incarceration of the Accused that created the conditions for
these potential witnesses to come forward and to give evidence whereas
before they were unwilling to do so.”93 While the majority of the Trial
Chamber ignored this reality, it is an important factor that should have been
weighed when evaluating the timeliness of the Prosecutor’s request for
amendment.
88. See id. ¶¶ 26-33 (discussing the variety of social pressures and potential for
stigma that often lead to the reluctance of victims of sexual violence to come forward
or testify).
89. See id. (highlighting the far-reaching consequences of systematic sexual
violence on a victim beyond the actual perpetrated act and noting the damage done not
only to the individual victim, but also the fear engendered in the community as a
whole).
90. See id. ¶ 30 (pointing out that many societies tend to blame victims of sexual
violence, thereby reinforcing victims’ feelings of shame, guilt, loneliness, and
depression).
91. See Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals
Judgment, ¶ 79 (May 28, 2008) (Winters, J., partially dissenting) (reiterating the
inadequacy of evidence simply indicating gender-based crimes and the importance of
the Prosecution waiting to file a motion to amend until they have sufficient material
facts to sustain a prima facie case).
92. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Majority Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for Leave to File an Interlocutory
Appeal against the Decision on the Prosecution’s Request for Leave to Amend the
Indictment against Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, ¶ 8
(Aug. 2, 2004) (discussing the Prosecution’s arguments against the contention made by
the court that the need for the amendment was based on a lack of due diligence on the
part of the Prosecution).
93. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment (Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Honourable Justice Renate Winters), ¶ 79 (noting the difficulty of getting
victims of gender-based offences to come forward and accepting the Prosecution’s
explanation as to why the motion to amend the indictment did not come sooner).
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In sum, the second lesson is that a gender-sensitive trial requires gendersensitive consideration of evidence. This did not happen in the CDF trial
for a number of reasons: the majority judges improperly prospectively
denied the introduction of evidence of gender-based crimes; one of the
majority judges improperly viewed such evidence as inherently prejudicial;
and the majority judges improperly excluded from their evaluation of
timeliness consideration of the circumstances surrounding the collection of
evidence of gender-based crimes.94 These mistakes should not be repeated
at the Special Court or any other international criminal tribunal.
V. LESSON THREE: JUDICIAL BALANCING IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE
GENDER-SENSITIVE PROSECUTIONS
The Special Court’s CDF case serves to illustrate the third lesson that it
is relevant for judges to consider gender-related issues as part of a rights
balancing exercise. This lesson stems from a series of motions decisions
that had a profoundly negative impact on the outcome of the CDF trial
judgment. As mentioned earlier, on February 9, 2004, the Prosecutor
sought leave to amend the CDF indictment to include charges relating to
the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage
(as an inhumane act), and the war crime of outrages upon personal
dignity.95 This request was made prior to the assignment of the trial date.
Similar requests to add these crimes to the AFRC and RUF indictments had
been approved.96 On May 20, 2004, just prior to the beginning of the
trial,97 a majority of the Trial Chamber rejected this request in a poorly
written and confusing decision.98 The majority held that the Prosecutor
brought the request after undue delay and that granting the request might
require an unreasonable delay in the trial in order to allow the accused to
prepare defenses to the new charges.99 In determining what constitutes an
94. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
95. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for

Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 6.
96. See Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon & Gbao, Case No.SCSL-04-15-PT, Decision
on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 25-28 (May 6, 2004)
(finding that in the overall interest of justice, indictments may be amended, the crucial
consideration being timing on the part of the prosecution); see also Prosecutor v.
Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request
for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶ 57 (May 6, 2004) (citing precedent from other
International Criminal Tribunals, the court held that where the Prosecution seeks to add
only one count that expands on the existing indictment, the amendment does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of the defendants).
97. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Boutet Dissent, ¶ 6 (establishing the
starting date of the CDF trial as June 3, 2004).
98. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 42, 48-86 (arguing that the Prosecution waited too
long to amend the indictment, and that the delay was undue).
99. See id. ¶¶ 43, 49, 55, 63 (criticizing the prosecution for what the court felt
amounted to a prosecutorial strategy relying on delay); Norman, Case No. SCSL-0414-PT, Boutet Dissent, ¶¶ 6, 37-48. In his dissent, Justice Boutet pointed out that the
case was being heard one month on and one month off, therefore no delay would occur
as the defense may be able to conduct any additional investigations during the months
off. He also pointed out that the Prosecutor only had “indications” of gender-based
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“a
much shorter time frame” for determinations of delay than might be the
case in other courts.100
Thus, for the majority judges, “extreme
expeditiousness” was the “watchword” of the trial (though the judges did
not comment on their own three and a half month delay in deciding the
motion) and the judges’ “permanent preoccupation” when determining the
interests of justice.101 The majority entirely discounted the Prosecutor’s
explanations as to why the motion was brought in February 2004, as well
as the Prosecutor’s argument that he has a specific duty to prosecute
gender-related crimes.102 Indeed, the majority seemed to imply that giving
any weight to these arguments would create an unwarranted exception.
[T]he rules relating to the detection and prosecution of [gender-based]
offences are the same as those governing the other war crimes and
international humanitarian offences, and must not constitute or give rise
to any exceptions to the general rules that relate to the respect and
protection of the interests of the Parties . . . and the overall interests of
103
justice.

Justice Boutet wrote a strong dissent to the majority decision.104 In
examining the nature of the offences, Justice Boutet correctly balanced the
rights of the accused with the duty of the Prosecutor not to bring charges
before he has evidence strong enough for a reasonable certainty of
conviction.
The Prosecutor unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal from the Trial
Chamber, despite arguing that the decision rendered him unable to establish
a complete and accurate historical record of the crimes committed during
the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, failed to acknowledge the right of the
victims to have crimes committed against them characterized as genderbased crimes, and permitted impunity for these crimes.105 The end result
crimes, as opposed to solid evidence, as of June 2003. Id.
100. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend Indictment, ¶ 53 (highlighting the differences between an
international tribunal and a municipal judiciary, noting both the limited duration of the
tribunal, and the importance of the perception of its credibility).
101. See id. ¶¶ 53, 61 (discussing the judges’ desire to honor the mandate
establishing their court, the decision contends that only by expediting the trial will
justice be properly administered within judicial traditions and norms).
102. See id. ¶ 58 (arguing that the Prosecution’s attempt to amend the indictment
violates the defendants’ right to be fairly and properly informed of the charges they
face, and faulting the diligence of the Prosecution for not including the gender offences
in the initial indictment).
103. See id. ¶ 83 (echoing the decision’s main point that the nature of the gender
offences alone should not dictate whether the court sustains the motion to amend).
104. See supra Section IV for analysis of Justice Boutet’s understanding that the
collection of evidence of gender-based crimes may be more difficult than the collection
of evidence of other crimes, and that this fact is relevant to considering timeliness.
105. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Majority Decision on the Prosecution’s
Application for Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal, ¶¶ 4, 6 (arguing that without
allowing the additional charges, many of the crimes committed during the armed
conflict in Sierra Leone will go unpunished); Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Boutet
Dissent, ¶ 27 (maintaining that the prosecution not only can, but further has a duty to,
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was that no gender-based charges were considered by the CDF Trial
Chamber and the trial judgment is consequently silent on these types of
crimes.
Following the issuance of the trial judgment, the Prosecutor asked the
Appeals Chamber to consider whether the Trial Chamber’s denial of his
request to amend the indictment represented an error in law, in fact or in
procedure.106 As a pragmatic remedy, he requested that, if an error was
found, the Appeals Chamber simply reverse the legal reasoning employed
by the Trial Chamber and issue a declaration to this effect.107 The usual
remedy would be a retrial, but a retrial is impractical as the Special Court is
slated to close in mid 2010.108 The Appeals Chamber declined to consider
the appeal, stating that to do so would only be an “academic exercise”
given the remedy requested and the fact that the request does not relate to
actual verdicts in the trial judgment.109
In contrast, Justice Winter, in a convincing and well-argued dissent,
considered the Prosecutor’s appeal. She found that the Trial Chamber
majority’s reasoning “contained both errors of law invalidating the decision
and errors of fact which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”110
Winter took the reasoning begun by Justice Boutet further. She held that
the Trial Chamber did not correctly balance the rights of the accused to be
tried without undue delay and to have adequate time to prepare a defense
with several factors: the scope and nature of the amendments;111 the
consequences of admittance—and denial—of amendments on the trial
proceedings;112 whether the amendments will help to ensure “that the real
issues in the case will be determined”; the difference between the duty of
the Prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the defense’s
burden to show that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not shown; and
bring newly found charges); Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No.
SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Prosecution Appeal Against the Trial Chamber’s Decision
of 2 August 2004 Refusing Leave to File an Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 44 (Jan. 17, 2005)
(holding that the Prosecution’s attempt to appeal directly to the Appeals Chamber was
not properly brought as the Appeals Chamber did not have jurisdiction to hear such an
appeal).
106. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 410.
107. Id.
108. Id. ¶ 425; Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 68 (Winter,
J., partially dissenting).
109. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 427; id. ¶ 73
(Winter, J., partially dissenting) (noting that consideration of this ground of appeal is
far from an academic exercise, considering that “refusing to address the merits of the
Prosecution’s Ground of Appeal at the final stage permanently denies the Prosecution
the opportunity to have the merits of its contentions adjudicated on appeal, which . . .
denies it the right to a fair trial”).
110. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 65 (Winter, J., partially
dissenting).
111. See id. ¶ 79 (Winter, J., partially dissenting) (including taking into account that
“victims of gender-based violence generally express greater reluctance to report and
testify on those events than victims of other crimes”).
112. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 427 (considering
only the consequences of admittance of the amendments, and not the impact of denial).
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interest of the victims of the offence charged”).113 In Winter’s view,
another crucial factor to consider is whether denial of the amendments
would impede the Special Court’s fulfillment of its mandate, which
includes the prosecution of gender-based crimes and providing victims with
proper access to justice.114 She found that the decision of the Trial
Chamber majority to deny the amendments did deny the ability of the
Special Court to fulfill its mandate, which includes the prosecution of
gender-based violence, and prevented—likely forever due to the impact of
amnesty in the Lomé Peace Accord—victims of gender-based violence
from seeing their case adjudicated before the Special Court.115
Michelle Staggs Kelsall and Shanee Stepakoff have examined this last
point in detail. They studied the impact on the Prosecutor’s proposed
victim-witnesses of the denial of the indictment amendment, and the
subsequent, equally concerning refusal to allow the Prosecutor to use
evidence of gender-based violence to prove other charges.116 They argue
that the Trial Chamber majority should not only have considered the legal
impact of the denial on the victims, as Justice Winter has advocated, but
also the personal impact.117 The victims, who all had agreed to testify to
various forms of gender-based violence before the Special Court, were
silenced by the denial of the indictment amendment, which has led to
lasting negative psychological effects.118 They conclude that the Trial
Chamber “seemingly needed to balance the harm done to the victimwitness in being precluded from giving evidence against the harm done to
the accused in having the evidence heard.”119
The third lesson learned from the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s trial
and appellate judgments to date is found in the CDF dissents: judicial
balancing is key to gender-sensitive justice. Justice Boutet indicated that
evidence of gender-based crimes may need to be considered in light of the
difficulty of collecting such evidence. Justice Winter outlined how the
113. See Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶¶ 82-85 (Winter, J.,
partially dissenting); id. ¶¶ 79-80, 84 (pointing out several factual errors made by the
Trial Chamber majority, as well as that their estimate of a two year delay was purely
speculative); id. ¶ 85 (contending that the Trial Chamber majority should have
considered “the impact on and significance of prosecuting the material facts alleged in
the amended indictment” because “the denial of the amendments precluded that any of
the gender-based violence allegedly committed against women and girls by the
Kamajors/CDF during the armed conflict could be prosecuted”).
114. Id. ¶¶ 85-86.
115. Id. ¶ 86.
116. Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, “When We Wanted to Talk About
Rape”: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT’L J.
TRANSNAT’L JUST. 355, 355 (2007). See also Oosterveld, Consideration of GenderBased Violence, supra note 62; Oosterveld, Child Soldiers and Forced Marriage, supra
note 62.
117. Kelsall & Stepakoff, supra note 116, at 357, 373.
118. Id. at 373.
119. Id. at 366.
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rights of the accused needed to be balanced with, among other factors,
consideration of the nature of collecting gender-based evidence, the impact
of denial of the amendments to victims’ access to justice, resulting
impunity for gender-based crimes, and the Special Court’s overall mandate
to prosecute gender-based crimes. These factors are not only important for
the CDF’s specific indictment amendment decision, but for any occasion
on which gender-based crimes are considered within international criminal
justice proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has outlined three lessons that can be drawn from the AFRC
and CDF cases, and their trial and appeals judgments, at the Special Court
for Sierra Leone. Part of the first lesson is that gendered crimes may be
multilayered and complex. An excellent example of such a crime is forced
marriage. In the AFRC trial judgment, a majority of the judges held that
forced marriage is subsumed by the crime of sexual slavery, but the
Appeals Chamber subsequently concluded that this is an overly simplistic,
and incorrect, understanding of the crime.120 According to the Appeals
Chamber, forced marriage should be defined not by the sexual and nonsexual acts that are indicators of the crime, but as forced conjugal
association resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental, or
psychological injury to the victim.121 Another interlinked notion (and the
final part of the first lesson) is that seemingly gender-neutral crimes, such
as the war crime of cruel treatment or the crime against humanity of other
inhumane acts may contain gendered elements. The Appeals Chamber has
commented, in both the AFRC and CDF appeals judgments, that acts of
gender-based violence can be used to prove such crimes.122
The second lesson to be gleaned from the Special Court’s judgments is
related to evidence. In the CDF case, a majority of the Trial Chamber
failed to consider the difficulties often associated with collecting evidence
of gender-based violence, and the specific difficulties in this respect related
to ongoing strong support of the CDF.123 One of the majority judges even
implied that that evidence of gender-based violations is inherently more
prejudicial than other kinds of evidence.124 As a result, the majority
rejected the Prosecutor’s request, first, to amend the joint indictment to
include certain gender-based crimes and, second, to consider evidence of
gender-based acts as proof of other crimes.125 The result was the exclusion
of consideration of gender-based crimes in the CDF trial judgment and,
120.
121.
122.
123.

Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 195.
Id. ¶ 196.
Id. ¶¶ 184-186.
Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Reasoned Majority Decision on
Prosecution Motion for a Ruling on the Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 65 (Itoe, J.,
concurring).
124. Id. ¶ 4.
125. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
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consequently, silence within the Special Court’s record of CDF crimes.126
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within the Special Court or any other institution tasked with implementing
international criminal law.
The final lesson also stems from the CDF case and relates to how the
Court’s mandate to address gender-based crimes is connected with the
rights of the accused. In the CDF case, when making the decisions to deny
the Prosecutor’s requests to amend the indictment to add gender-based
crimes and to consider acts of gender-based violence as proof of other
crimes, the majority of the Trial Chamber failed to consider, alongside the
defendants’ rights, the Prosecutor and Court’s obligations with respect to
gender-based crimes. They should have examined, inter alia, whether
denial of the amendments would impede the Special Court’s fulfillment of
its mandate and whether victims would be denied proper access to justice.
These three lessons, which in some respects are particular to the Special
Court’s AFRC and CDF cases, are in other respects also relevant to the
Charles Taylor and RUF cases currently before the Special Court, and to
the future work of the International Criminal Court.127 All international or
internationalized tribunals should ensure that gender-based crimes are
understood not only as crimes of rape, but also as crimes targeted at
individuals because of socially-constructed understandings of their sex.
Furthermore, those working within tribunals should understand that acts of
gender-based violence can be used to prove a variety of crimes and should
not only be confined to proving sexual crimes. Evidence of gender-based
crimes should be dealt with sensitively, with an understanding of any
difficulties related to evidence collection, and without assumptions that it
may be more prejudicial to the case of an accused than other evidence.
Finally, in weighing the rights of the accused, judges must also ask if there
are other relevant factors that should be considered, such as the access of
victims to justice or the overall mandate of the tribunal.

126. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 446.
127. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-75, Amended

Indictment (Mar. 17, 2006) (charging Taylor with the crimes against humanity of rape
and sexual slavery and the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity).
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